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美聯(lián)儲(Fed)上次上調(diào)目標(biāo)利率的時候,，那次決定似乎算不上什么大事。那是2006年6月29日,，美國的通脹率為4%,，股市已經(jīng)連續(xù)18個月平緩上漲，每個人都知道加息將要到來,。
美聯(lián)儲在簡短的公報中移除了將在下次會議上再度加息的慣常承諾,，這足夠引發(fā)股市的大幅反彈。
在今天的會議之前使用的術(shù)語是一次“溫和的上調(diào)”——暗示之后無需再跟隨另一次上調(diào),。
在越來越熱烈的猜測之后,，本周如果加息，外界的反應(yīng)不大可能“溫和”,。要想知道原因,，就看一看這個世界在中間相隔的9年中發(fā)生了什么變化。
上一次,，美聯(lián)儲理事們報告稱,，“房地產(chǎn)市場正在逐漸冷卻”，這種輕描淡寫是致命的,。所謂的“逐漸冷卻”變成了房價暴跌,，引發(fā)了近一個世紀(jì)以來最嚴重的信貸危機，以及為應(yīng)對危機而進行的規(guī)?？涨暗呢泿糯碳び媱?。當(dāng)時美聯(lián)儲可以參考很多先例；而現(xiàn)在可供參考的先例很少或者沒有,。
當(dāng)時美國的消費者物價通脹率是2%的目標(biāo)的兩倍,，現(xiàn)在為0.2%。當(dāng)時的失業(yè)率比現(xiàn)在更低,。這是美聯(lián)儲獲得加息授權(quán)的兩項關(guān)鍵目標(biāo)指標(biāo),，從它們來看,，現(xiàn)在比當(dāng)時更難找到理由加息。
大宗商品“超級周期”在2006年后發(fā)生逆轉(zhuǎn),。之后的兩年里,，油價先是上漲一倍，然后出現(xiàn)暴跌?，F(xiàn)在油價比2006年6月低三分之一,。如果說現(xiàn)在有什么壓力的話，那也是通縮壓力,。來自新興市場的充滿活力的增長來源現(xiàn)在處于缺乏狀態(tài),。新興市場已經(jīng)回吐了漲幅，投資者對中國經(jīng)濟放緩的風(fēng)險憂心忡忡,。
最后一個問題是,，債券市場發(fā)生了改變。銀行在金融危機中徘徊在死亡關(guān)口的經(jīng)歷,，以及之后強制施加的嚴格得多的監(jiān)管,，讓推動債券市場的經(jīng)紀(jì)商的能力大幅下降，即使為了利用持續(xù)走低的利率,，債券發(fā)行量大幅增加。
債券收益率沒有什么明顯理由的波動凸顯出,，利率翻倍可能引起異常激烈的反應(yīng),，因為賣家找不到有意愿的買家。在這樣的環(huán)境下,，加息的事實可能會壓倒任何伴隨的安慰訊息,。上次加息是“溫和”的——現(xiàn)在要再次取得同樣的效果，會困難得多,。（中國進出口網(wǎng)）
The last time the Federal Reserve raised its target interest rate, the decision did not seem such a big deal. It was June 29, 2006, US inflation was running at 4 per cent, stock markets had been rising unremarkably for 18 months, and everybody knew the rise was coming.
The Fed’s brief communique, in which it removed its customary commitment to raise again at its next meeting, was enough to prompt a big rebound for stock markets.
This was in the jargon being used ahead of today’s meeting, a “dovish hike” — a rise accompanied by hints it need not be followed by another.
It is highly unlikely that a rise this week, after increasingly feverish speculation, would be greeted so calmly. To see why, see how the world has changed in the intervening nine years.
Then, the Fed’s governors reported, with fateful understatement, there was “a gradual cooling of the housing market”. That gradual cooling turned into a crash for housing prices that sparked the deepest credit crisis in almost a century, and an unprecedented monetary stimulus in response. There were plenty of precedents to guide the Fed then; there are few or none now.
US consumer price inflation, double the 2 per cent target then, now stands at 0.2 per cent. Unemployment was lower then than now. These are the two key targets of the Fed’s official mandate, and make a rise far harder to justify now.
The commodity “supercycle” has turned since 2006. Over the ensuing two years, oil prices doubled then crashed. They are now a third lower than they were that June. The pressure, if anything, is towards deflation. The effervescent source of growth from emerging markets is now lacking. They have given up their gains, with investors preoccupied by the risk of a slowdown in China.
A final issue is that bond markets have changed. Banks’ near-death experience during the crisis, and the subsequent imposition of far heavier regulation, has left the dealers who drive the market for bonds with far less capacity, even as far more debt has been issued to take advantage of persistent lower rates.
Swings in bond yields, for little apparent reason, emphasise that a doubling of rates could create a disproportionate reaction as sellers fail to find willing buyers. In such circumstances, the fact of a rate rise could overwhelm any reassuring accompanying message. The last rate rise was “dovish” — achieving the same effect again will be far harder.
