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2009年時(shí),，西方國(guó)家只顧竭力尋找復(fù)蘇苗頭,，卻未在意周小川發(fā)出的,、無(wú)異于建構(gòu)世界金融新秩序的呼吁,。
中國(guó)央行行長(zhǎng)當(dāng)時(shí)提議,，用國(guó)際貨幣基金組織(IMF)控制下的一個(gè)全球體系取代美元作為國(guó)際儲(chǔ)備貨幣,。如果不出所料，IMF本月將同意把人民幣納為儲(chǔ)備貨幣,，對(duì)周小川2009年提出的愿景來(lái)說(shuō),，這將是向前邁出的一小步，但對(duì)人民幣來(lái)說(shuō)卻是一個(gè)重大舉措,。
人民幣加入IMF特別提款權(quán)（SDR,，即分配給會(huì)員國(guó)的記賬單位）貨幣籃子——目前包括美元、歐元,、日元及英鎊——的前景得到各種各樣的解讀：從北京方面得到象征性的自我滿足,，到一個(gè)新時(shí)代的開啟。
幾乎可以肯定,，這將會(huì)像中國(guó)的許多金融改革一樣：雖然事后看來(lái)意義重大,，但短期內(nèi)很難激起熱情。
市場(chǎng)對(duì)早期改革（如十年前人民幣與美元脫鉤）的熱情已讓位于怠倦情緒,，因?yàn)橹袊?guó)的體量越來(lái)越大,、改革的步伐卻越來(lái)越小。結(jié)果就是在數(shù)字方面往往令人失望,，因?yàn)橹袊?guó)始終不愿進(jìn)行全面的改革,。
即便是實(shí)施一年之久的“滬港通”,，在許多人看來(lái)也不是什么值得大書特書的舉措，因?yàn)榕c之相關(guān)的絕對(duì)數(shù)字較小,。然而,，滬港通的真正意義在于，它是首個(gè)允許境外投資者直接購(gòu)買在中國(guó)內(nèi)地上市的公司股票的機(jī)制（不需要一個(gè)個(gè)審批）,。
人民幣納入SDR也有可能被這種不值得大書特書的舉措,。這就沒(méi)有抓住問(wèn)題的關(guān)鍵。人民幣納入SDR的重點(diǎn)不是為了提升各國(guó)央行對(duì)人民幣的短期需求,，而是為了將人民幣融入國(guó)際體系,，促使北京方面推行金融改革。
如果人民幣占到SDR貨幣籃子10%的份額,，儲(chǔ)備管理機(jī)構(gòu)將只需購(gòu)買價(jià)值280億美元的人民幣——相對(duì)于在岸即期市場(chǎng)每天200億美元的交易量,，這并非一個(gè)特別可觀的數(shù)字。（中國(guó)進(jìn)出口網(wǎng)）
Back in 2009 the west was desperately seeking green shoots of recovery and paid little attention when Zhou Xiaochuan called for nothing less than a new world financial order.
China’s central bank governor proposed replacing the US dollar as the international reserve currency with a global system controlled by the International Monetary Fund. If, as expected, the IMF this month approves the inclusion of the renminbi as a reserve currency, it will mark a small step for Mr Zhou’s 2009 vision but a big move for the renminbi.
The prospect of China’s currency joining the dollar, euro, yen and sterling in backing the IMF’s Special Drawing Rights — its unit of account, restricted to member governments — has been described as everything from a symbolic ego trip on the part of Beijing to the dawning of a new era.
In all probability it will be like many Chinese financial reforms: significant in hindsight, but hard to get excited about in the short term.
Market enthusiasm for early-stage reforms such as de-pegging the renminbi 10 years ago has given way to ennui as the changes get smaller and China gets bigger. The result is often disappointment in the numbers as China maintains an antipathy to the sweeping changes, accompanied by headline-grabbing figures, beloved of newly installed western executives and politicians.
Even the Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect, a year old this week, was shrugged aside by many, because the absolute numbers involved are relatively small. However, its real significance lies in the fact that it was the first scheme under which foreign investors had been allowed in “blind” — without requiring individual approval.
SDR inclusion risks being categorised the same way. That would miss the point. It is not about boosting short-term demand from central banks for renminbi. Rather it is about embedding the currency in the international system and committing Beijing to financial reform.
If China were to constitute up to 10 per cent of the SDR basket, reserve managers would need to buy just $28bn of its currency — not a particularly meaningful number compared with the $20bn traded daily in the onshore spot market.
