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過去一年里，中國以前所未有的方式把自己的印記加在世界經(jīng)濟(jì)上,。中國經(jīng)濟(jì)放緩不僅給能源和大宗商品生產(chǎn)國帶來痛苦,；它還嚴(yán)重制約了其它發(fā)展中國家的增長，拖累了全球經(jīng)濟(jì)增長。同樣引人注目的是今夏中國股市大幅下跌以及把握不當(dāng)?shù)娜嗣駧刨H值促使美聯(lián)儲(Federal Reserve)在9月份推遲加息,。
與美聯(lián)儲相比,，沒有一家央行在制定政策時更加不容易受到外部影響。美聯(lián)儲這一次意外表現(xiàn)出敏感性,，突顯世界已被中國的崛起改變,。
最后，人民幣被納入國際貨幣基金組織(IMF)的儲備貨幣籃子,，使北京方面的雄心得以實(shí)現(xiàn),。
2016年，中國將再次成為決定世界經(jīng)濟(jì)走勢和資本流動方向的非常重要的因素,。但這一次的故事不會再是關(guān)于經(jīng)濟(jì)放緩,。正如工業(yè)生產(chǎn)數(shù)據(jù)所表明的，各項(xiàng)經(jīng)濟(jì)刺激措施正在奏效,。更強(qiáng)勁的基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施投資,，尤其是來自地方政府的此類投資，正使投資出現(xiàn)起色,。國有企業(yè)近來加大了投資力度,。
這代表著回歸由投資和出口拉動的、北京方面此前試圖擺脫的舊的增長模式,。面對今年程度遠(yuǎn)超預(yù)期的經(jīng)濟(jì)放緩,，黨的官員們改變了政策，無疑擔(dān)心老工業(yè)出現(xiàn)大量失業(yè)將導(dǎo)致社會不安定,，進(jìn)而對黨的執(zhí)政地位構(gòu)成威脅,。
明年將出現(xiàn)確鑿的證據(jù)，顯示轉(zhuǎn)向消費(fèi)的經(jīng)濟(jì)再平衡以及推進(jìn)金融自由化的計(jì)劃是否已被徹底拋棄,。如果答案為是,，中國將在以后為延續(xù)浪費(fèi)的資源分配不當(dāng)付出更高代價。
世界其他地區(qū)將會付出代價,。一種不可持續(xù)的增長模式的惡性外部結(jié)果是,，近年許多產(chǎn)業(yè)的回報(bào)率低迷，因?yàn)橹袊觿×巳虍a(chǎn)能過剩,。在分析美國以及歐洲大多數(shù)國家自金融危機(jī)爆發(fā)以來工業(yè)投資水平偏低時,，人們對這個因素說得不夠多。
一個主要問題涉及匯率戰(zhàn)爭,。中國工業(yè)近年受困于缺乏競爭力的匯率,，人民幣盯住不斷飆升的美元使這個問題更加嚴(yán)重。本月中國央行宣布轉(zhuǎn)向以一籃子貨幣為基準(zhǔn),，表面上有助于過渡到在更大程度上由市場決定的人民幣匯率形成機(jī)制。但它也提供了一層掩護(hù)，讓中國人民銀行(PBoC)引導(dǎo)人民幣貶值,。與此同時,，大幅下跌的生產(chǎn)者價格正在加劇人民幣實(shí)際匯率走低。
對世界其他地區(qū)而言,，人民幣有序的貶值也許是一件可對付的事情,，因?yàn)榘l(fā)達(dá)經(jīng)濟(jì)體目前受困于需求不足。來自中國的更便宜進(jìn)口,，加上油價下跌增加消費(fèi)者收入,，將有益地促進(jìn)消費(fèi)。
如果是比較劇烈的貶值（或許被日本進(jìn)一步付諸競爭性貶值所引發(fā)）,，那可能就是另外一回事了,，尤其是如果它在美國的大選年激發(fā)美國的保護(hù)主義沖動。美國的可貿(mào)易商品部門相對于整體經(jīng)濟(jì)規(guī)模并不大,，但美國出口商在國會山有相當(dāng)強(qiáng)大的游說力量,。但話說回來，全球供應(yīng)鏈的存在意味著,，保護(hù)主義論調(diào)可能會比全球化之前的時期低一些,。
如果中國官方恢復(fù)金融改革意愿，世界其他地區(qū)可能感受到另一種沖擊,。實(shí)現(xiàn)資本賬戶完全自由化將釋放巨大的儲蓄資金池,，允許其自由流向境外市場。向具備健全產(chǎn)權(quán)制度和穩(wěn)定治理的國家分流一部分投資的誘惑將難以抵擋,。這將導(dǎo)致一些泡沫,，尤其是在發(fā)展中國家相對狹小的市場，但在富國也有可能,。一個經(jīng)濟(jì)體可能發(fā)生更糟糕的事情,。（中國進(jìn)出口網(wǎng)）
Over the past year, China has put its mark on the world economy as never before. Not only did its economic slowdown inflict pain on energy and commodity producers; it acted as a serious restraint on growth in the rest of the developing world and held back global economic growth. Equally striking was the way the stock market collapse and mismanaged devaluation in the summer caused the US Federal Reserve to postpone an interest rate rise in September.
No central bank is less prone to responding to external influences when making policy. The Fed’s unexpected sensitivity on this score was a measure of how the world has been changed by China’s rise.
And finally Beijing succeeded in its ambition to have the renminbi included in the International Monetary Fund’s basket of reserve currencies.
In 2016 China will once again be very important in determining the path of the world economy and the direction of capital flows. But this time the story will not be about a slowing economy. As industrial production numbers indicate, measures to stimulate the economy are having an impact. Investment is picking up in response to stronger infrastructure investment, especially from local governments. State-owned enterprises have been investing more heavily.
This represents a return to the old growth model led by investment and exports from which Beijing was trying to escape. When confronted with a slowdown this year that far exceeded their expectations, party officials changed course, no doubt fearing that high unemployment in older industries would lead to social unrest that could pose a threat to the party’s grip on power.
Next year will provide conclusive evidence on whether plans to rebalance the economy towards consumption and continue financial liberalisation have gone out the window. If so, China will pay a higher price later on for perpetuating a costly misallocation of resources.
The rest of the world stands to pay a price. A malign external outcome of an unsustainable growth model is that returns in many industries have been depressed because of the Chinese contribution to global excess capacity. That is an undermentioned factor in the low levels of investment by industry in the US and much of Europe since the financial crisis.
One of the biggest questions relates to currency wars. Chinese industry has been struggling with an uncompetitive exchange rate. That problem has been exacerbated by the renminbi peg to a soaring dollar. The decision this month to switch to a basket of currencies ostensibly helps the transition to a more market-determined exchange rate. It also provides a smokescreen for the People’s Bank to bring about a depreciation of the renminbi. At the same time a sharp fall in producer prices is contributing to a real depreciation of the currency.
An orderly depreciation might be a manageable proposition for the rest of the world, given that the advanced economies suffer from deficient demand. Cheaper imports from China would be a useful spur to increased consumption, coming on top of a decline in the oil price that has boosted consumer incomes.
A more precipitate depreciation, perhaps prompted by further resort to competitive devaluation by Japan, might be another matter, especially if it unleashes a protectionist impulse in the US in a presidential election year. The US tradeable goods sector is small in relation to the overall economy, but US exporters have considerable lobbying power on Capitol Hill. That said, the existence of global supply chains means that protectionist rhetoric may be more muted than in pre-globalisation days.
Should Chinese officials regain their appetite for financial reforms, another kind of shock may be felt elsewhere. A move to full capital account liberalisation would free the vast pool of savings to head for foreign markets. The temptation to diversify into investments in countries with more secure property rights and stable governance would be overwhelming. That would lead to bubbles, especially in the relatively narrow markets of the developing world, but also in rich countries. Worse things can happen to an economy.
