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過去幾個月中國的股市動蕩和人民幣小幅貶值,，使得金融圈人士注意到中國經(jīng)濟的疲弱。他們自然要問,，中國經(jīng)濟疲弱將對世界其他地區(qū)產(chǎn)生何種影響,。答案是，影響甚微,，最重要的原因在于,，至少4年里中國沒有對全球經(jīng)濟真正做出貢獻(xiàn)。
認(rèn)為中國經(jīng)濟疲弱對世界經(jīng)濟構(gòu)成威脅的觀點,，融合了大量的錯誤觀念,。第一個錯誤觀念是，這種疲弱是個新現(xiàn)象,。實際上,，當(dāng)初的中國股市攀升和人民幣升值，才多少出人意料,；如果要說什么的話,，那就是注定發(fā)生的局部調(diào)整來得太晚了。
中國經(jīng)濟開始走弱不遲于2008年,，很可能還更早,。始于2009年末并延續(xù)至2010年的一輪暫時上行，源于一場不可持續(xù)的,、不明智的,、前所未有的債務(wù)爆炸。從2011年開始,，世界經(jīng)濟的起伏便不再是由于中國經(jīng)濟的起伏了——中國經(jīng)濟表現(xiàn)的趨勢是一路下行,。
想要看出這一點,，就有必要更精確地理解“經(jīng)濟”這個術(shù)語。經(jīng)濟增長可以理解為經(jīng)通脹調(diào)整的（實際）個人收入的增長,。長期以來,，中國以低成本生產(chǎn)壓低通脹，對全球?qū)嶋H個人收入增長做出了貢獻(xiàn),。10年前,，這是一個非常重要的作用，因為若沒有中國的低成本生產(chǎn),，全球通脹水平會高出很多,。
不過，如今世界面臨通縮壓力,，而中國增添了額外,、甚至過大的通縮壓力。另外,，鑒于中國仍是一個主要的競爭性生產(chǎn)大國,，并且目前沒有能力推高大宗商品價格，我們很難看出,，中國如何能夠?qū)μ岣吆Ｍ獾拿x收入做出凈貢獻(xiàn),。
當(dāng)然，討論經(jīng)濟問題的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)辦法是使用國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值(GDP),。大多數(shù)評論員使用GDP和“經(jīng)濟”時,，兩者是可以相互替換的。這是一個明顯的誤導(dǎo)性錯誤,。在1月中旬的時候,，GDP很小，經(jīng)濟卻不小,。人均GDP沒有價值——不然嘗試把它花掉試試,。
GDP確實使中國顯得非常重要,。國際貨幣基金組織(IMF)經(jīng)常把中國列為對全球GDP增長貢獻(xiàn)最大的國家,。但
IMF所說的充其量是一種很奇怪意義上的貢獻(xiàn)者。如果中國官方統(tǒng)計數(shù)據(jù)準(zhǔn)確的話,，中國提高了全球GDP增長率的平均值,。而如果北京方面承認(rèn)GDP增長率不是7%，而是比如說4%的話,，那么全球GDP增長率均值將會下降,。
簡單說，誰會在意呢,？即便中國GDP增速下跌拉低全球均值,，世界其他地區(qū)也沒有變化,。這并非任何真正意義上的全球衰退。
更重要的是,，中國并未對世界其他地區(qū)的GDP做出貢獻(xiàn),。即便中國確實在對全球經(jīng)濟做出貢獻(xiàn)，它也同時在減少其他地區(qū)的GDP,。這是因為,，貿(mào)易順差（凈出口）在GDP中被計為正數(shù)，而貿(mào)易逆差被計為負(fù)數(shù),。以這種方式對待貿(mào)易并無太大意義,，但那些用GDP突出中國對世界重要性的人，受到GDP定義的束縛,。
去年,，中國的官方貿(mào)易順差——巨大的商品貿(mào)易順差和不低的服務(wù)貿(mào)易逆差之和——約為3800億美元。這就使世界其他地區(qū)的GDP減少了3800億美元,。中國過去10年都出現(xiàn)高額貿(mào)易順差,，每年都減少、而不是增加世界其他地區(qū)的GDP,。
中國GDP增長率下降本身對其他地區(qū)并不產(chǎn)生絲毫意義,。對GDP重要的是貿(mào)易順差的規(guī)模。如果中國貿(mào)易順差上升,，那么世界其他地區(qū)GDP將相應(yīng)減少（其他所有條件不變的話）,。在這種情況下，貿(mào)易順差也是表明中國對世界真實影響的一個合理指標(biāo),。中國貿(mào)易順差上升表明,，中國正在壓低全球價格，加劇既有通縮局面,。
GDP常常是不重要的,，而中國公布的GDP尤其不重要。想要評估中國對世界經(jīng)濟的影響,，請忽略GDP,，從貿(mào)易著手。（中國進(jìn)出口網(wǎng)）
Stock market volatility and a small currency devaluation have in the past few months caused the financial community to take note of Chinese economic weakness. A natural question is what effect this weakness will have on the rest of the world. The answer is very little, with most important reason being that China has not truly contributed to the global economy for at least four years.
The idea that Chinese weakness threatens the world economy melds a number of misconceptions. The first is that the weakness is a new phenomenon. It was actually the initial stock market climb and a rising renminbi that were somewhat surprising; the ensuring partial corrections were late in coming, if anything.
China’s economy began weakening no later than 2008, and probably before. A temporary upswing starting in late 2009 and continuing into 2010 was due to an unsustainable, unwise, and unprecedented explosion in debt. From 2011 on, ups and downs in the global economy have not been due to ups and downs in China – the trend in Chinese performance has been invariably down.
To see this, it’s necessary to be more precise about the term “economy.” Economic growth can be understood as growth in inflation-adjusted (real) personal income. China has long contributed to global growth in real personal income by dampening inflation with low-cost production. A decade ago, this was an important role because inflation could have been considerably higher without low-cost Chinese production.
Now, however, the world faces deflationary pressure and China’s deflationary contribution is extraneous, even excessive. Further, it is hard to see how China can be contributing on a net basis to higher nominal incomes overseas given that it remains a major production competitor and not presently capable of driving commodity prices higher.
Of course, the standard way of discussing the economy is to use gross domestic product (GDP). Most commentators use GDP and “the economy” interchangeably. This is a clear and misleading error. The economy is not tiny in the middle of January, as GDP is. GDP per person has no value – just try to spend it.
GDP does make China look very important. The IMF routinely ranks China as the leading contributor to global GDP growth. At best, this is a very strange notion of a contributor. China raises the global GDP growth average, if its official statistics are accurate. If Beijing were ever to acknowledge that GDP growth was, say, four percent instead of seven, average global GDP growth would fall.
To put it succinctly: who cares? In a situation wher a Chinese GDP growth dro lowers the world average, the rest of the world has not changed. This is not a global recession in any meaningful sense.
More important, China does not contribute to the rest of the world’s GDP. It detracts from it, even when China is in fact contributing to the global economy. This is because a trade surplus (net exports) is counted as a positive in GDP and a deficit is counted as a negative. Treating trade in this way does not make much sense but those using GDP to heighten China’s importance to the world are stuck with its definition.
China’s official trade surplus – its huge goods surplus and sizable services deficit combined –was roughly $180bn last year. This constitutes $180bn subtracted from the rest of the world’s GDP. China has been running large trade surpluses for a decade, each and every year subtracting from the rest of the world’s GDP, not contributing.
Slower Chinese GDP growth would, in itself, mean nothing at all to anyone outside the country. What matters to GDP is the size of the trade surplus. If it rises, then rest-of-world GDP falls by that amount (everything else constant). In this case, the trade surplus is also a reasonable representative for China’s true impact on the world. A rising surplus says China is pushing down prices around, intensifying existing deflation.
It is often the case that GDP does not matter and it is typically the case that China’s claimed GDP does not matter. To evaluate China’s impact on the world economy, ignore GDP and start with trade.
