如果
中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)年增長(zhǎng)率僅為2%,那將是怎樣的情形,?鑒于中國(guó)在過(guò)去30年的表現(xiàn),,這聽(tīng)起來(lái)像是一個(gè)悲觀到荒謬程度的問(wèn)題。當(dāng)然,,中國(guó)存在多方面的問(wèn)題,。事實(shí)上,中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)已開(kāi)始放緩,。但是,,什么樣的災(zāi)難才可能把中國(guó)增速拉到如此慘不忍睹的地步呢?
根據(jù)美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家蘭特•普里切特(Lant Pritchett)和勞倫斯•薩默斯(Lawrence Summers)的一份頗有影響力的論文,,這是一個(gè)錯(cuò)誤的問(wèn)題,。在他們看來(lái),有關(guān)增長(zhǎng)的“唯一最強(qiáng)大和驚人的事實(shí)”是“回歸(約2%的)均值”,。他們說(shuō),,在現(xiàn)代歷史上,只在極少的情況下,,國(guó)家才能將超過(guò)6%的“超高速”增長(zhǎng)維持10年以上,。而自1977年以來(lái),,中國(guó)通過(guò)調(diào)動(dòng)市場(chǎng)力量突破了這個(gè)慣常趨勢(shì),締造了“人類歷史上”可能最長(zhǎng)的高速增長(zhǎng)期,。但這兩位作者告訴我們,,有升必有降。
他們?cè)谑崂頂?shù)據(jù)之后,,得出兩條強(qiáng)大的結(jié)論,。其一是,通過(guò)一個(gè)十年預(yù)測(cè)下一個(gè)十年的增長(zhǎng),,幾乎沒(méi)有統(tǒng)計(jì)學(xué)基礎(chǔ),。外推法是一種傻瓜游戲——或者如他們所言,“目前的增長(zhǎng)對(duì)預(yù)測(cè)未來(lái)幾乎毫無(wú)作用”,。從1967年到1980年,,巴西的年均增長(zhǎng)率為5.2%。當(dāng)時(shí)很少有人會(huì)預(yù)測(cè),,在接下來(lái)22年巴西人均收入增長(zhǎng)率將恰好為零,。
他們的第二項(xiàng)發(fā)現(xiàn)是,超高速增長(zhǎng)期的平均長(zhǎng)度是9年,。中國(guó)大陸是一個(gè)很大的例外,。唯有臺(tái)灣和韓國(guó)的表現(xiàn)與其接近,它們的高速增長(zhǎng)期分別為32年和29年,。兩位作者表示,,一旦這樣的增長(zhǎng)期結(jié)束,增長(zhǎng)率降幅的均值是4.65個(gè)百分點(diǎn),。按此計(jì)算,,中國(guó)的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)率將降至4%,印度將降至1.6%——遠(yuǎn)低于幾乎所有人的預(yù)測(cè),。
該文可能具有重要的經(jīng)濟(jì)和地緣政治意義,。如果中國(guó)和印度保持目前的增長(zhǎng)軌跡,,到2033年其國(guó)內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值(GDP)之和將從目前的11萬(wàn)億美元,,上升至66萬(wàn)億美元。如果完全回歸均值增速,,到時(shí)中印GDP之和僅能達(dá)到24萬(wàn)億美元,。兩位作者沒(méi)有必要解釋中國(guó)或(實(shí)際上)印度的增速為何應(yīng)會(huì)如此陡峭下降。這不過(guò)就是目前發(fā)生的事情,。他們的步步分析使得解釋怎樣才能不發(fā)生這種情況成為樂(lè)觀者的責(zé)任,。
有幾種可以想象到的反駁理由。第一個(gè)適用于新興市場(chǎng)的總體狀況,。“趨同”理念認(rèn)為,,貧窮國(guó)家可以比富國(guó)增長(zhǎng)得更快,。這部分是因?yàn)?ldquo;低懸的果實(shí)”;例如,,把人們從生產(chǎn)率低的農(nóng)村工作,,轉(zhuǎn)向生產(chǎn)率更高的城市工作。窮國(guó)也可以學(xué)習(xí)模仿富國(guó),;它們不必重新發(fā)明輪子,。哈佛大學(xué)(Harvard)歷史學(xué)教授尼爾•弗格森(Niall Ferguson)提到了“繁榮的6大殺手級(jí)應(yīng)用”:競(jìng)爭(zhēng)、科學(xué)革命,、財(cái)產(chǎn)權(quán),、醫(yī)學(xué)、消費(fèi)社會(huì)和職業(yè)道德,。既然我們已知道它們是什么,,就可以“下載”它們。包括日本,、臺(tái)灣,、韓國(guó)和新加坡在內(nèi),幾個(gè)亞洲經(jīng)濟(jì)體的生活水平或多或少都趕上了西方,。如果它們能做到,,為什么其他經(jīng)濟(jì)體不能?然而,,回歸均值意味著,,如此迅速的追趕是不可能的,或者至少是非常困難的,。
中國(guó)有沒(méi)有什么特定因素表明它能夠逆勢(shì)而上,?首先,中國(guó)已經(jīng)做到了這一點(diǎn),,快速增長(zhǎng)期超過(guò)了30年,。兩位經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家說(shuō),這使得快速放緩的可能性變得更大,。但也許會(huì)出現(xiàn)相反情況,。中國(guó)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人可能已經(jīng)學(xué)會(huì)了如何戰(zhàn)勝命運(yùn)。第二,,“金磚國(guó)家”(Brics)一詞的發(fā)明者吉姆•奧尼爾(Jim O'Neill)說(shuō),,兩位作者的數(shù)據(jù)可能由于拉美、中東和非洲這些最令人失望的經(jīng)濟(jì)體而有所偏差,?;蛟S,亞洲經(jīng)濟(jì)體已經(jīng)發(fā)現(xiàn)了一種獨(dú)家秘方,。第三,,在中國(guó)的長(zhǎng)期增長(zhǎng)之前,,是幾十年的混亂和低水平增長(zhǎng)。我們現(xiàn)在看到的,很可能真是一種被長(zhǎng)期壓抑之后的復(fù)蘇——這是中國(guó)自己的回歸均值過(guò)程。第四,,中國(guó)的體量可能產(chǎn)生規(guī)模經(jīng)濟(jì)和國(guó)內(nèi)市場(chǎng)規(guī)模方面的維持增長(zhǎng)的優(yōu)勢(shì)。如果此情屬實(shí),,這也適用于印度。(
中國(guó)進(jìn)出口網(wǎng))
What would China look like if it were growing at just 2 per cent a year? That sounds like a ridiculously pessimistic question given China’s performance in the past three decades. Certainly, it has manifold problems. Indeed, its economy is already slowing. But what misadventure could possibly bring its growth rate crashing down so spectacularly?
That is the wrong question, according to an influential paper by US economists Lant Pritchett and Lawrence Summers . For them, “the single most robust and striking fact” about growth is “regression to the mean” of about 2 per cent. only rarely in modern history, they say, have countries grown at “super-rapid” rates above 6 per cent for much more than a decade. China has managed to buck the trend since 1977 by harnessing market forces, engineering possibly the longest spell “in the history of mankind”. But what goes up, the authors tell us, must eventually come down.
They have trawled through the data and drawn two powerful conclusions. One is that there is almost no statistical basis for predicting growth from one decade to another. Extrapolation is a mug’s game – or, as they put it, “current growth has very little predictive power”. From 1967 to 1980, Brazil grew at an average annual rate of 5.2 per cent. Few would have predicted, then, that for the next 22 years per capita income would grow at precisely zero.
Their second finding is that episodes of super-rapid growth last a median of nine years. China is the big exception. The only countries with fast-growth episodes that come close are Taiwan and South Korea, which managed 32 and 29 years respectively. According to the authors, once such episodes end, the median dro in growth is 4.65 points. That would cut China’s growth to 4 per cent and India’s to 1.6 per cent – far lower than almost anyone is predicting.
The thesis has huge potential ramifications, both economic and geopolitical. If China and India continue their current growth trajectories, their combined gross domestic product will rise to $66tn by 2033, against $11tn today. If they regressed fully to mean, they would reach a combined GDP of just $24tn. The authors have no need to explain why China’s, or indeed India’s, growth should fall so precipitously. This is just what happens. Their reasoning puts the onus on optimists to explain otherwise.
There are several conceivable rejoinders. The first applies to emerging markets generally. The idea of “convergence” holds that poor countries can grow faster than rich ones. That is partly because there is low-hanging fruit; for example, moving people from unproductive rural jobs to more productive urban ones. Poor countries can also copy rich ones; they do not have to reinvent the wheel. Niall Ferguson, professor of history at Harvard University, refers to “six killer apps of prosperity”: competition, scientific revolution, property rights, medicine, consumer society and the work ethic. Since we already know what they are, they can be “downloaded”. Several Asian economies, including Japan, Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore have more or less caught up with western living standards. If they can do it, why not others? Regression to mean, however, implies that such speedy catch-up is impossible, or at least very difficult.
Is there anything about China specifically that suggests it could buck the trend? First, it has already done so, growing rapidly for more than 30 years. The two economists say this makes a rapid slowdown more likely. But perhaps it is the reverse. Chinese leaders may have learnt how to beat the odds. Second, as Jim O’Neill, who coined the term Brics, says, the authors’ data may be skewed by the mostly disappointing economies of Latin America, the Middle East and Africa. Perhaps Asian economies have discovered a secret sauce. Third, China’s long-lived expansion follows many decades of chaos and suboptimal growth. What we are seeing now could plausibly be a long-pent-up recovery – the country’s own regression to mean. Fourth, China’s size could confer growth-sustaining advantages in terms of economies of scale and size of domestic market. If true, that would also apply to India.