??
重要的事情先說,。我們不太可能重演上世紀30年代的局面,。世界大型經(jīng)濟體沒有刻意推行“以鄰為壑”的貶值政策，保護主義也沒有以丑陋的面目卷土重來,。正如美國人常說的：情況正常,，只是一切都亂了——或者諸如此類的話。
然而,，我們不應(yīng)忽視某些暗潮,。美元正在飆升，出口增長正在放緩,。同樣的道理也適用于人們普遍預(yù)期,、但并未真正發(fā)生的制造業(yè)重返美國,。美國的大多數(shù)競爭對手正在削減利率,，他們的貨幣兌美元匯率下跌。如果這些趨勢持續(xù)（它們會持續(xù)的）,，美國政治將做出反應(yīng),。美元上漲不像人們所以為的那樣是件小事。
然而,，美元上漲的步伐很難停下來,。北美和其他多數(shù)大型經(jīng)濟體的增長差距是切實存在的——用美聯(lián)儲(Fed)主席珍妮特•耶倫(Janet Yellen)的話來說，北美的增長是“穩(wěn)健的”,。因此,，它們之間的貨幣政策差距也在逐步擴大。美國十年期債券收益率處于僅僅1.7%的歷史低位,。但與德國,、日本甚至英國的十年期債券（分別為0.3%、0.25%和1.3%）相比,，這已經(jīng)是很高的收益率了,。投資者將會繼續(xù)買入美元。
隨著美聯(lián)儲邁向近十年來首次加息,，這種差距將變得更加顯著,。其他大多數(shù)國家正在降息,。在過去3周里，加拿大,、印度和新加坡全都下調(diào)了本國的貸款利率,。預(yù)計澳大利亞和土耳其將會效仿。歐洲央行(ECB)和丹麥的名義利率正在進入負值區(qū)間,。歐元與美元等值可能只是時間問題,。
這些不是“大蕭條”(Great Depression)式的貶值。歐洲以及其他國家正在加快量化寬松步伐以提振經(jīng)濟增長,，而不是為了要在貶值的道路上跑贏美國,。但效果是一樣的。
美元上漲有兩方面的風(fēng)險,。首先,，它對企業(yè)賬面利潤的影響越來越大。美國標普500指數(shù)成分股公司的近一半收入來自海外,，凈利潤中的海外份額甚至更高,。美元越強勢，它們的利潤增長越弱,。
在2014年最后一個季度,，許多大型公司發(fā)布的業(yè)績報告顯示利潤下降?？ㄌ乇死?Caterpillar)的利潤下降25%,。寶潔(Proctor & Gamble)預(yù)計，由于強勢美元的影響,，2015年的利潤將會出現(xiàn)零增長,。甚至蘋果(Apple)和谷歌(Google)也就“猛烈的匯率逆風(fēng)”發(fā)出警告。這有助于解釋今年1月美國股市在美元上漲的同時下跌5%,。
其次,，政治上的反彈越來越大。上周,，共和黨和民主黨施壓美國貿(mào)易代表邁克•弗羅曼(Mike Froman),，要求他將匯率操縱條款寫進《跨太平洋戰(zhàn)略經(jīng)濟伙伴關(guān)系協(xié)定》(TPP)——日本是焦點。盡管中國沒有參與TPP,，但人民幣是他們的真正目標,。弗羅曼將他們的問題轉(zhuǎn)給美國財政部長杰克•盧(Jack Lew)，后者堅稱強勢美元符合美國的利益,。
盧說的是套話,，而且可以說具有誤導(dǎo)性。但正如我的同事艾倫•貝蒂(Alan Beattie)所指出的,，貨幣操縱取決于觀點,。一個人眼里的貨幣貶值,，在另一個人眼里也許是貨幣政策。針對匯率操縱的規(guī)則不可能得到執(zhí)行,。堅持要求這些規(guī)則將破壞太平洋貿(mào)易協(xié)定取得成功的可能性,。
然而，隨著出口停滯和制造業(yè)就業(yè)崗位未能回流至美國,，政治上的辯論可能越來越激烈,。上月，美國前財長勞倫斯•薩默斯(Lawrence Summers)和英國影子財政大臣埃德•鮑爾斯(Ed Balls)在美國進步中心(Center for American Progress)出爐了一份關(guān)于包容性繁榮的報告,。該報告列舉了一套明確的政策來扭轉(zhuǎn)西方中產(chǎn)階級收入下降的趨勢,，包括擴大員工所有制，改進帶薪產(chǎn)假制度,，提高最低工資水平以及加強職業(yè)培訓(xùn),。這些提議被視為希拉里•克林頓(Hillary Clinton)競選總統(tǒng)的政策藍圖。該報告還提議“新的貿(mào)易協(xié)定應(yīng)該明確包括可執(zhí)行的針對匯率操縱的紀律”,，這令人震驚,，因為薩默斯一貫反對此類條款。有了此類依據(jù),，無怪乎左,、右翼都呼吁納入遏止匯率操縱的條款。
那么,，強勢美元的結(jié)局將會如何,？好的一面是，耶倫可以在比預(yù)期更長的時間里保持零利率,。目前薪資和通脹幾乎沒有上漲跡象,。美元越強勢,，進口成本越低,。油價不斷下跌也有所幫助。
按歐洲的標準,，美國正在設(shè)法應(yīng)對一個高級問題,。壞消息是，美國的復(fù)蘇建立在消費增長的老套模式的基礎(chǔ)之上,。在2014年最后一個季度,，2.6%的增長是家庭支出（而非投資）推動的。美國企業(yè)實際上在削減國內(nèi)支出,。
既然美國消費支出增長是廉價借貸成本（而非中產(chǎn)階級收入增長）推動的,，當利率周期變化時，這種增長就會難以為繼,。大多數(shù)美國人仍在懷疑復(fù)蘇的力度,。鑒于人們以不到3%的利率就可獲得30年期的抵押貸款,，買房子的人這么少令人意外。很難相信,，當耶倫最終采取加息行動的時候,，會有更多的人買房子。
從某個方面來說,，盧是正確的,。強勢美元反映出美國的成功。它也可能說明了,，要當心你自己的愿望,。（中國進出口網(wǎng)）
First things first. We are not about to replay the 1930s. The world’s big economies are not deliberately indulging in “beggar thy neighbour” devaluations and protectionism is not poised for an ugly revival. As they say in the US: situation normal, all fouled up — or words to that effect.
Yet there are undertows we ignore at our risk. The US dollar is surging and export growth is slowing. The same applies to the widely forecast stampede of reshoring to the country, which is not really happening. Most US competitors are cutting interest rates and watching their currencies fall against the dollar. If these trends persist, and they will, US politics will react. A rising dollar is not the picnic it is made it out to be.
Yet it is hard to see what will stop it. The gap between North America’s growth, which is “solid”, in the words of Janet Yellen, US Fed chairman, and that of most other big economies is real. So, too, is the growing monetary divergence. US 10-year bond yields are historically low at just 1.7 per cent. But these are juicy compared to Germany (0.3 per cent), Japan (0.25 per cent) and even the UK (1.3 per cent). Investors will keep buying the dollar.
This will become more pronounced as the Fed moves towards its first rate rise in almost a decade. Most others are cutting theirs. In the past three weeks, Canada, India, and Singapore have all reduced their lending rates. Australia and Turkey are expected to follow suit. The European Central Bank and Denmark are moving into negative nominal territory. It is probably a matter of time before the euro reaches parity with the dollar.
These are not Great Depression-style devaluations. The Europeans and others are stepping up quantitative easing to revive growth, not to undercut the US. But the effect is the same.
The dangers are two-fold. First, there is an increasingly strong effect on the corporate bottom line. Almost half of the revenues of US S&P 500 companies come from overseas, and an even higher share of net profits. The stronger the dollar, the weaker their earnings growth.
In the last quarter of 2014, many big companies reported declining profits. Caterpillar’s fell by 25 per cent. Proctor & Gamble forecasts zero growth in 2015 because of the strong dollar. Even Apple and Google warned of “strong currency headwinds”. This helps explain why US equity markets dropped by 5 per cent in January, while the dollar rose.
Second, the political backlash is growing. Last week, Republicans and Democrats pressed Mike Froman, the US chief trade negotiator, to include a currency manipulation clause in the Transpacific Partnership trade deal — with Japan the focus. Though China is not part of the TPP, the remininbi was their real target. Mr Froman re-directed their questions to Jack Lew, the Treasury secretary, who insists a strong dollar is in America’s interests.
Mr Lew’s mantra is formulaic, and arguably misleading. But as my colleague Alan Beattie has pointed out, currency shenanigans are in the eye of the beholder. One person’s devaluation is another’s monetary policy. Rules against it are impossible to enforce. Insisting on them would wreck chances of a Pacific trade deal.
Yet, as exports stall and manufacturing jobs fail to return to the US, the political debate is likely to grow louder. Last month, Lawrence Summers, the former US Treasury secretary, and Ed Balls, the UK shadow chancellor, came out with a report on inclusive prosperity at the Center for American Progress. It offers a clear set of policies to reverse the declining incomes of the western middle class. These include broadening employee ownership, improving parental leave, raising the minimum wage and stepping up vocational training. Its findings are seen as a blueprint for Hillary Clinton’s presidential campaign. Astonishingly, given that Mr Summers has long opposed such clauses, it also recommends “new trade agreements should explicitly include enforceable disciplines against currency manipulation”. With such cover, it is little wonder both left and right are clamouring for their inclusion.
What, then, will become of the strong dollar? The upside is that Ms Yellen can afford to keep interest rates at zero for longer than expected. There is scant sign of wage growth and inflation is nowher on the horizon. The stronger the dollar, the lower the cost of imports. Falling oil prices also help.
By Europe’s standards, the US is grappling with a high-class problem. The bad news is that its recovery is based on the familiar model of rising consumption. In the last quarter of 2014, growth of 2.6 per cent was driven by household spending, rather than investment. American companies are actually cutting domestic outlays.
Since rising US consumer spending is driven by cheap borrowing costs rather than growing middle class earnings, it is vulnerable to a turn in the interest rate cycle. Most Americans are still cautious about the strength of the recovery. With 30-year mortgages available at less than 3 per cent, it is striking how few are buying homes. It is hard to believe more will do so when Ms Yellen finally acts.
In one respect, Mr Lew is right. The strong dollar reflects America’s success. It may also be a case of being careful what you wish for.
