目前國外有種態(tài)度認(rèn)為，歷史將會記錄,，對俄羅斯的制裁標(biāo)志著全球化倒退的開始,，具有劃時代意義,。有一天我聽到一位德國高官在德國馬歇爾基金會(German Marshall Fund)的斯德哥爾摩中國論壇(Stockholm China forum)上談到這種想法。這是一個有意思的觀點,，但它錯過了一個更加關(guān)鍵的問題,。這些制裁只是癥狀，而非原因,。全球化倒退在俄羅斯總統(tǒng)弗拉基米爾•普京(Vladimir Putin)與烏克蘭開戰(zhàn)之前早就開始了,。
對于那些認(rèn)為國際安全要求任何國家都不能侵犯鄰國的人來說，停止與莫斯科開展經(jīng)貿(mào)往來的理由是顯而易見的,。對西方的批評有一條是成立的,，那就是它的反應(yīng)過于遲緩。普京在每一步都無情地利用了美國的猶豫和歐洲的分歧,。
普京將會繼續(xù)這么做,，直至北約(Nato)將威懾重新置于歐洲安全的核心。對付普京的民族統(tǒng)一主義,，需要硬實力支持的強(qiáng)硬外交,。只有當(dāng)他明白侵略將招致不可接受的報復(fù)的時候，他才會收手,。為了讓威懾可信,，北約必須在其東部前線部署地面部隊。波羅的海已經(jīng)取代柏林,，成為西方?jīng)Q心的試金石,。
一些國家（尤其是在新興世界，但也有其它國家）透過不同的棱鏡看待制裁,。通過在經(jīng)濟(jì)上懲罰俄羅斯,，美國和歐洲正在破壞開放的國際體系。持這種想法的人表示,，必須把經(jīng)濟(jì)與變幻莫測的政治糾紛分開,。如果美國和歐洲為了狹隘的利益而大肆破壞公平的國際競爭環(huán)境，新興大國為何要接受這種環(huán)境,？
這些批評人士說的沒錯,，全球經(jīng)濟(jì)一體化需要一個合作的政治架構(gòu)。然而,，對俄羅斯的制裁符合一個更大的格局,，那就是2008年爆發(fā)金融危機(jī)以來全球化的解體。它們證明了美國態(tài)度的深遠(yuǎn)轉(zhuǎn)變,。華盛頓逐步退出全球參與,，并不局限于美國總統(tǒng)巴拉克•奧巴馬(Barack Obama)的原則，即美國不再做“蠢事”,。
當(dāng)今全球化時代的設(shè)計師不愿再做全球化的保障者,。對于維護(hù)一個將實力重新分配給競爭對手的秩序,，美國看不到關(guān)鍵的國家利益。無論中國,、印度以及其他國家對此可能有什么怨言,，但它們不愿站出來做多邊主義的捍衛(wèi)者。如果沒人捍衛(wèi)全球化,，全球化必然會“年久失修”,。
不那么久以前，金融和互聯(lián)網(wǎng)是緊密相連世界的最強(qiáng)大渠道,，也是其明顯象征。自由流動的資本和數(shù)字通信不受國界的束縛,。通過金融創(chuàng)新（以及徹頭徹尾的欺騙）,，新興世界的巨額盈余回流到手頭拮據(jù)的美國中產(chǎn)階層購房者和西班牙陽光海岸有問題的投機(jī)者。銀行界的巨頭們以所謂 “華盛頓共識”(Washington Consensus)的名義轉(zhuǎn)動他們的輪盤賭,。
隨后爆發(fā)了金融危機(jī),。金融業(yè)重新國有化。銀行由于面臨新的監(jiān)管控制而收縮,。歐洲金融一體化發(fā)生了逆轉(zhuǎn),。全球資本流動如今仍只有危機(jī)前最高水平的一半左右。
就數(shù)字化世界來說,，任何人在任何地方都能獲得相同信息的觀念,，與威權(quán)政治和人們對隱私的關(guān)切發(fā)生抵觸。中國,、俄羅斯,、土耳其以及其他國家在數(shù)字高速公路上設(shè)置“路障”以遏制異議。歐洲人希望不受美國情報機(jī)構(gòu)的監(jiān)視和數(shù)字巨頭壟斷資本主義的影響,?；ヂ?lián)網(wǎng)正走向“巴爾干化”。
開放的貿(mào)易體系正趨向割裂,。多哈回合談判失敗意味著全球自由貿(mào)易協(xié)定的解體,。發(fā)達(dá)經(jīng)濟(jì)體正轉(zhuǎn)而考慮地區(qū)聯(lián)盟和協(xié)定——《跨太平洋戰(zhàn)略經(jīng)濟(jì)伙伴關(guān)系協(xié)定》(TPP)和《跨大西洋貿(mào)易和投資伙伴關(guān)系協(xié)定》(TTIP)。新興經(jīng)濟(jì)體正在構(gòu)建南南關(guān)系,。對于未能成功推動國際貨幣基金組織(IMF)調(diào)整權(quán)重感到失望的金磚國家(Brics),，正在建立它們自己的金融機(jī)構(gòu)。
南北雙方的國內(nèi)政治強(qiáng)化了這些趨勢,。如果說西方領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人對全球化產(chǎn)生戒心,，那么他們的許多選民已變得對全球化有敵意。在美國和歐洲,，全球化被兜售為一種開明的自利行為——在一個無國界的世界,，大家都將是贏家,。在最高層的1%人群拿走經(jīng)濟(jì)一體化好處之際，對受到擠壓的中產(chǎn)階層來說,，情況似乎并非如此,。
雖然南方在舊秩序下蓬勃發(fā)展——中國加入世界貿(mào)易組織(WTO)是本世紀(jì)以來最大的地緣政治事件——但新興大國對多邊主義沒表現(xiàn)出什么興趣。舊秩序被普遍視為是美國霸權(quán)的工具,。印度破壞了重振WTO的最新努力,。
全球化需要足以保證公平適用規(guī)則的執(zhí)法者（或稱霸主）、大國合作或全球治理安排,。如果沒有共同努力定位國家利益的政治架構(gòu),，經(jīng)濟(jì)框架注定會支離破碎。
狹隘的民族主義排擠了全球承諾,。制裁是這個故事的一個情節(jié),，但俄羅斯對國際秩序的蔑視是更大的情節(jié)。遺憾的是,，我們在1914年就知道,，經(jīng)濟(jì)上的相互依存不足以阻止大國對抗。
（更多全球資訊請關(guān)注中國進(jìn)出口網(wǎng)）
The world is marching back from globalisation
There is a mood abroad that says history will record that sanctions against Russia marked the start of an epochal retreat from globalisation. I heard a high-ranking German official broach the thought the other day at the German Marshall Fund’s Stockholm China Forum. It was an interesting point, but it missed a bigger one. The sanctions are more symptom than cause. The rollback began long before Russia’s Vladimir Putin’s war against Ukraine.
The case for calling a halt to business as usual with Moscow is self-evident to anyone who considers that international security demands nations do not invade their neighbours. The valid criticism of the west is that it has been too slow to react. At every step, the Russian president has ruthlessly exploited US hesitation and European divisions.
He will do so until Nato restores deterrence to the core of European security. Mr Putin’s irredentism demands tough diplomacy stiffened by hard power. He will stop when he understands that aggression will invite unacceptable retaliation. To make deterrence credible, the alliance must put boots on the ground on its eastern flank. The Baltics have replaced Berlin as the litmus test of western resolve.
Some, particularly though not exclusively in the rising world, have seen sanctions through a different prism. By punishing Russia economically, the US and Europe are undermining the open international system. Economics, this cast of mind says, must be held apart from the vicissitudes of political quarrels. Why should new powers sign up to a level international playing field if the US and Europe scatter it with rocks in pursuit of narrow interests?
These critics are right to say an integrated global economy needs a co-operative political architecture. Sanctions against Ukraine, though, fit a bigger picture of the unravelling of globalisation since the financial crash of 2008. They testify to a profound reversal in US attitudes. Washington’s steady retreat from global engagement reaches beyond Barack Obama’s ordinance that the US stop doing “stupid stuff”.
The architect of the present era of globalisation is no longer willing to be its guarantor. The US does not see a vital national interest in upholding an order that redistributes power to rivals. Much as they might cavil at this, China, India and the rest are unwilling to step up as guardians of multilaterism. Without a champion, globalisation cannot but fall into disrepair.
Not so long ago, finance and the internet were at once the most powerful channels, and visible symbols, of the interconnected world. Footloose capital and digital communications had no respect for national borders. Financial innovation (and downright chicanery) recycled the huge surpluses of the rising world to penurious homebuyers in Middle America and dodgy speculators on the Costa del Sol. The masters of the banking universe spun their roulette wheels in the name of something called the Washington consensus.
Then came the crash. Finance has been renationalised. Banks have retreated in the face of new regulatory controls. European financial integration has gone into reverse. Global capital flows are still only about half their pre-crisis peak.
As for the digitalised world, the idea that everyone, everywher should have access to the same information has fallen foul of authoritarian politics and concerns about privacy. China, Russia, Turkey and others have thrown roadblocks across the digital highway to stifle dissent. Europeans want to protect themselves from US intelligence agencies and the monopoly capitalism of the digital giants The web is heading for Balkanisation.
The open trading system is fragmenting. The collapse of the Doha round spoke to the demise of global free trade agreements. The advanced economies are looking instead to regional coalitions and deals – the Trans Pacific Partnership and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Pact. The emerging economies are building south-south relationships. Frustrated by a failure to rebalance the International Monetary Fund, the Brics nations are setting up their own financial institutions.
Domestic politics, north and south, reinforces these trends. If western leaders have grown wary of globalisation, many of their electorates have turned positively hostile. Globalisation was sold in the US and Europe as an exercise in enlightened self-interest – everyone would be a winner in a world that pulled down national frontiers. It scarcely seems like that to the squeezed middle classes as the top one per cent scoop up the gains of economic integration.
Much as the south has prospered within the old rules – China’s admission to the World Trade Organisation was been the biggest geopolitical event so far of the present century – yet the new powers show scant enthusiasm for multilateralism. The old order is widely seen as an instrument of US hegemony. India scuppered the latest attempt to reinvigorate the WTO.
Globalisation needs an enforcer – a hegemon, a concert of powers or global governance arrangements sufficient to make sure the rules are fairly applied. Without a political architecture that locates national interests in mutual endeavours, the economic framework is destined to fracture and fragment.
Narrow nationalisms elbow aside on global commitments. Sanctions are part of this story, but Russia’s contempt for the international order is a bigger one. Sad to say, we learnt in 1914 that economic interdependence is a feeble bulwark against great power rivalry.

（更多全球資訊請關(guān)注中國進(jìn)出口網(wǎng)）