目前國(guó)外有種態(tài)度認(rèn)為,，歷史將會(huì)記錄，對(duì)俄羅斯的制裁標(biāo)志著全球化倒退的開始,，具有劃時(shí)代意義,。有一天我聽到一位德國(guó)高官在德國(guó)馬歇爾基金會(huì)(German Marshall Fund)的斯德哥爾摩中國(guó)論壇(Stockholm China forum)上談到這種想法。這是一個(gè)有意思的觀點(diǎn),，但它錯(cuò)過(guò)了一個(gè)更加關(guān)鍵的問(wèn)題,。這些制裁只是癥狀，而非原因,。全球化倒退在俄羅斯總統(tǒng)弗拉基米爾•普京(Vladimir Putin)與烏克蘭開戰(zhàn)之前早就開始了,。
對(duì)于那些認(rèn)為國(guó)際安全要求任何國(guó)家都不能侵犯鄰國(guó)的人來(lái)說(shuō)，停止與莫斯科開展經(jīng)貿(mào)往來(lái)的理由是顯而易見的,。對(duì)西方的批評(píng)有一條是成立的,，那就是它的反應(yīng)過(guò)于遲緩。普京在每一步都無(wú)情地利用了美國(guó)的猶豫和歐洲的分歧,。
普京將會(huì)繼續(xù)這么做,，直至北約(Nato)將威懾重新置于歐洲安全的核心。對(duì)付普京的民族統(tǒng)一主義,，需要硬實(shí)力支持的強(qiáng)硬外交,。只有當(dāng)他明白侵略將招致不可接受的報(bào)復(fù)的時(shí)候，他才會(huì)收手。為了讓威懾可信,，北約必須在其東部前線部署地面部隊(duì),。波羅的海已經(jīng)取代柏林，成為西方?jīng)Q心的試金石,。
一些國(guó)家（尤其是在新興世界,，但也有其它國(guó)家）透過(guò)不同的棱鏡看待制裁。通過(guò)在經(jīng)濟(jì)上懲罰俄羅斯,，美國(guó)和歐洲正在破壞開放的國(guó)際體系,。持這種想法的人表示，必須把經(jīng)濟(jì)與變幻莫測(cè)的政治糾紛分開,。如果美國(guó)和歐洲為了狹隘的利益而大肆破壞公平的國(guó)際競(jìng)爭(zhēng)環(huán)境,，新興大國(guó)為何要接受這種環(huán)境？
這些批評(píng)人士說(shuō)的沒錯(cuò),，全球經(jīng)濟(jì)一體化需要一個(gè)合作的政治架構(gòu),。然而，對(duì)俄羅斯的制裁符合一個(gè)更大的格局,，那就是2008年爆發(fā)金融危機(jī)以來(lái)全球化的解體,。它們證明了美國(guó)態(tài)度的深遠(yuǎn)轉(zhuǎn)變。華盛頓逐步退出全球參與,，并不局限于美國(guó)總統(tǒng)巴拉克•奧巴馬(Barack Obama)的原則,，即美國(guó)不再做“蠢事”。
當(dāng)今全球化時(shí)代的設(shè)計(jì)師不愿再做全球化的保障者,。對(duì)于維護(hù)一個(gè)將實(shí)力重新分配給競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手的秩序,，美國(guó)看不到關(guān)鍵的國(guó)家利益。無(wú)論中國(guó),、印度以及其他國(guó)家對(duì)此可能有什么怨言,，但它們不愿站出來(lái)做多邊主義的捍衛(wèi)者。如果沒人捍衛(wèi)全球化,，全球化必然會(huì)“年久失修”,。
不那么久以前，金融和互聯(lián)網(wǎng)是緊密相連世界的最強(qiáng)大渠道,，也是其明顯象征,。自由流動(dòng)的資本和數(shù)字通信不受國(guó)界的束縛。通過(guò)金融創(chuàng)新（以及徹頭徹尾的欺騙）,，新興世界的巨額盈余回流到手頭拮據(jù)的美國(guó)中產(chǎn)階層購(gòu)房者和西班牙陽(yáng)光海岸有問(wèn)題的投機(jī)者,。銀行界的巨頭們以所謂 “華盛頓共識(shí)”(Washington Consensus)的名義轉(zhuǎn)動(dòng)他們的輪盤賭。
隨后爆發(fā)了金融危機(jī),。金融業(yè)重新國(guó)有化,。銀行由于面臨新的監(jiān)管控制而收縮。歐洲金融一體化發(fā)生了逆轉(zhuǎn)。全球資本流動(dòng)如今仍只有危機(jī)前最高水平的一半左右,。
就數(shù)字化世界來(lái)說(shuō),，任何人在任何地方都能獲得相同信息的觀念，與威權(quán)政治和人們對(duì)隱私的關(guān)切發(fā)生抵觸,。中國(guó),、俄羅斯、土耳其以及其他國(guó)家在數(shù)字高速公路上設(shè)置“路障”以遏制異議,。歐洲人希望不受美國(guó)情報(bào)機(jī)構(gòu)的監(jiān)視和數(shù)字巨頭壟斷資本主義的影響,。互聯(lián)網(wǎng)正走向“巴爾干化”,。
開放的貿(mào)易體系正趨向割裂,。多哈回合談判失敗意味著全球自由貿(mào)易協(xié)定的解體。發(fā)達(dá)經(jīng)濟(jì)體正轉(zhuǎn)而考慮地區(qū)聯(lián)盟和協(xié)定——《跨太平洋戰(zhàn)略經(jīng)濟(jì)伙伴關(guān)系協(xié)定》(TPP)和《跨大西洋貿(mào)易和投資伙伴關(guān)系協(xié)定》(TTIP),。新興經(jīng)濟(jì)體正在構(gòu)建南南關(guān)系,。對(duì)于未能成功推動(dòng)國(guó)際貨幣基金組織(IMF)調(diào)整權(quán)重感到失望的金磚國(guó)家(Brics)，正在建立它們自己的金融機(jī)構(gòu),。
南北雙方的國(guó)內(nèi)政治強(qiáng)化了這些趨勢(shì),。如果說(shuō)西方領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人對(duì)全球化產(chǎn)生戒心，那么他們的許多選民已變得對(duì)全球化有敵意,。在美國(guó)和歐洲，全球化被兜售為一種開明的自利行為——在一個(gè)無(wú)國(guó)界的世界,，大家都將是贏家,。在最高層的1%人群拿走經(jīng)濟(jì)一體化好處之際，對(duì)受到擠壓的中產(chǎn)階層來(lái)說(shuō),，情況似乎并非如此,。
雖然南方在舊秩序下蓬勃發(fā)展——中國(guó)加入世界貿(mào)易組織(WTO)是本世紀(jì)以來(lái)最大的地緣政治事件——但新興大國(guó)對(duì)多邊主義沒表現(xiàn)出什么興趣。舊秩序被普遍視為是美國(guó)霸權(quán)的工具,。印度破壞了重振WTO的最新努力,。
全球化需要足以保證公平適用規(guī)則的執(zhí)法者（或稱霸主）、大國(guó)合作或全球治理安排,。如果沒有共同努力定位國(guó)家利益的政治架構(gòu),，經(jīng)濟(jì)框架注定會(huì)支離破碎。
狹隘的民族主義排擠了全球承諾,。制裁是這個(gè)故事的一個(gè)情節(jié),，但俄羅斯對(duì)國(guó)際秩序的蔑視是更大的情節(jié)。遺憾的是,，我們?cè)?914年就知道,，經(jīng)濟(jì)上的相互依存不足以阻止大國(guó)對(duì)抗。
（更多全球資訊請(qǐng)關(guān)注中國(guó)進(jìn)出口網(wǎng)）
The world is marching back from globalisation
There is a mood abroad that says history will record that sanctions against Russia marked the start of an epochal retreat from globalisation. I heard a high-ranking German official broach the thought the other day at the German Marshall Fund’s Stockholm China Forum. It was an interesting point, but it missed a bigger one. The sanctions are more symptom than cause. The rollback began long before Russia’s Vladimir Putin’s war against Ukraine.
The case for calling a halt to business as usual with Moscow is self-evident to anyone who considers that international security demands nations do not invade their neighbours. The valid criticism of the west is that it has been too slow to react. At every step, the Russian president has ruthlessly exploited US hesitation and European divisions.
He will do so until Nato restores deterrence to the core of European security. Mr Putin’s irredentism demands tough diplomacy stiffened by hard power. He will stop when he understands that aggression will invite unacceptable retaliation. To make deterrence credible, the alliance must put boots on the ground on its eastern flank. The Baltics have replaced Berlin as the litmus test of western resolve.
Some, particularly though not exclusively in the rising world, have seen sanctions through a different prism. By punishing Russia economically, the US and Europe are undermining the open international system. Economics, this cast of mind says, must be held apart from the vicissitudes of political quarrels. Why should new powers sign up to a level international playing field if the US and Europe scatter it with rocks in pursuit of narrow interests?
These critics are right to say an integrated global economy needs a co-operative political architecture. Sanctions against Ukraine, though, fit a bigger picture of the unravelling of globalisation since the financial crash of 2008. They testify to a profound reversal in US attitudes. Washington’s steady retreat from global engagement reaches beyond Barack Obama’s ordinance that the US stop doing “stupid stuff”.
The architect of the present era of globalisation is no longer willing to be its guarantor. The US does not see a vital national interest in upholding an order that redistributes power to rivals. Much as they might cavil at this, China, India and the rest are unwilling to step up as guardians of multilaterism. Without a champion, globalisation cannot but fall into disrepair.
Not so long ago, finance and the internet were at once the most powerful channels, and visible symbols, of the interconnected world. Footloose capital and digital communications had no respect for national borders. Financial innovation (and downright chicanery) recycled the huge surpluses of the rising world to penurious homebuyers in Middle America and dodgy speculators on the Costa del Sol. The masters of the banking universe spun their roulette wheels in the name of something called the Washington consensus.
Then came the crash. Finance has been renationalised. Banks have retreated in the face of new regulatory controls. European financial integration has gone into reverse. Global capital flows are still only about half their pre-crisis peak.
As for the digitalised world, the idea that everyone, everywher should have access to the same information has fallen foul of authoritarian politics and concerns about privacy. China, Russia, Turkey and others have thrown roadblocks across the digital highway to stifle dissent. Europeans want to protect themselves from US intelligence agencies and the monopoly capitalism of the digital giants The web is heading for Balkanisation.
The open trading system is fragmenting. The collapse of the Doha round spoke to the demise of global free trade agreements. The advanced economies are looking instead to regional coalitions and deals – the Trans Pacific Partnership and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Pact. The emerging economies are building south-south relationships. Frustrated by a failure to rebalance the International Monetary Fund, the Brics nations are setting up their own financial institutions.
Domestic politics, north and south, reinforces these trends. If western leaders have grown wary of globalisation, many of their electorates have turned positively hostile. Globalisation was sold in the US and Europe as an exercise in enlightened self-interest – everyone would be a winner in a world that pulled down national frontiers. It scarcely seems like that to the squeezed middle classes as the top one per cent scoop up the gains of economic integration.
Much as the south has prospered within the old rules – China’s admission to the World Trade Organisation was been the biggest geopolitical event so far of the present century – yet the new powers show scant enthusiasm for multilateralism. The old order is widely seen as an instrument of US hegemony. India scuppered the latest attempt to reinvigorate the WTO.
Globalisation needs an enforcer – a hegemon, a concert of powers or global governance arrangements sufficient to make sure the rules are fairly applied. Without a political architecture that locates national interests in mutual endeavours, the economic framework is destined to fracture and fragment.
Narrow nationalisms elbow aside on global commitments. Sanctions are part of this story, but Russia’s contempt for the international order is a bigger one. Sad to say, we learnt in 1914 that economic interdependence is a feeble bulwark against great power rivalry.

（更多全球資訊請(qǐng)關(guān)注中國(guó)進(jìn)出口網(wǎng)）